This article critically examines the contribution of Parliamentary committees in
Introduction
In Zambia, according to one prominent former Member of the National Assembly who is now Secretary General of the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum, Parliament's work is 'shrouded in mystery and myth '. i This observation might seem unsurprising. Zambia's Parliament has never enjoyed a high reputation, not least because of an enduring presidential bias to the political system. Moreover between the mid-1970s and 1990
it was the country's declining economic fortunes not its political institutions that formed the principal object of attention, once social scientists became disillusioned with the failure of President Kaunda's seemingly innovative attempt to make 'humanism' the governing credo.
Furthermore there is now a consensus that parliaments the world over are generally in decline, ii
The study argues that the parliamentary committees have minimal effect in making government accountable, notwithstanding their hard work and the commencement of a programme of modernising reform in 1999. Effective accountability demands not just that the executive is required to give an account of its conduct (answerability) but that the strictures of bodies that should hold government to account are enforceable. It is in the matter of enforceability that the committees are most deficient. However, this defect is a weakness in the totality of executive-legislative relations as determined by Zambia's constitution; it is embedded in a cluster of institutional relations, whose reform is long overdue.
iii The committees by themselves are relatively powerless to change that. But that fact does not make them irrelevant. On the contrary, the article suggests that the committees actually and potentially perform some very useful functions, in particular exposing the operations of government to a critical light -in a country where much political debate is of a polemical and personally-charged nature and pays too little attention to careful presentation of the evidence.
After a brief introduction to the political context, the article proceeds by presenting detailed evidence about the performance of these little known institutions in Zambia, before drawing inferences about their effectiveness by reference to a checklist of functions or roles against which parliamentary committees can be assessed.
In Zambia there is a programme of reforms to modernise Parliament, but will they help the committee system, in principle one of the leading agents of accountability, to fully realise its potential? Here the argument is much less sanguine. The article agrees that constitutional reforms like allowing the National Assembly to pass motions censuring individual ministers would represent an advance, in so far as ministers were then less likely to be captured by the benefit of grant SGS/00500/G from the Nuffield Foundation. The writer thanks the journal's referees for constructive comments on an earlier version of the article.
narrow agendas of the presidency or selfish interests. But not even the advocates of 'new institutionalism' who argue that the organisation of political life makes a difference, iv assert that institutional tinkering is a panacea -not in Zambia, not in any of the new and emerging democracies, and not even in the established democracies, where there is much evidence of an erosion of public confidence in government and in the legislators. In Zambia the formal political institutions cannot be divorced from such environmental factors as the informal patterns of neo-patrimonialism and clientelism (which undermine the distinction between public and private spheres and inject particularistic values into public service), the predominant party system and the extreme poverty of the people. v The United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index places Zambia 143 out of 162 countries; around 90 per cent of the population are reckoned to be trying to survive on the equivalent of less than two dollars a day. These contextual matters have profound political significance and occupy a big canvas. They have been explored elsewhere and are not the primary focus here. For the presumption that a comprehensive understanding of the parliamentary committees cannot be gained in complete isolation from the broader issues does not mean we should spurn more focused attempts at uncovering the 'mystery and myth'. After all, it would be absurd to pretend that nothing valuable can be discovered about something unless something is said about everything -an impractical proposition, anyway.
Political Context
Zambia's constitution provides for a hybrid form of government that combines a strong executive presidency with parliamentary characteristics and traditions inherited from the Westminster system. Parliament consists of the President, who is both head of state and head of government and is elected directly by the people, and the National Assembly, which comprises 150 elected seats and up to eight seats appointed by the President. According to Article 87 of the constitution the laws and customs of the Parliament of England shall apply to the National Assembly, with such modifications as Parliament itself has authorised. The President and Parliament both serve five-year terms, which run concurrently. The government is made up of the President and cabinet ministers and other ministers and deputy ministers -a total number approaching 70 -appointed by the President from the members of the House.
The constitution states that cabinet shall formulate the policy of the government and shall be responsible for advising the President on policy. It also says that cabinet and deputy ministers shall be accountable collectively to the National Assembly. But the notion that ministers should be individually so accountable has been resisted by the executive, on the grounds that they are appointed by and answerable to the President. concludes with an account of the reasons why even further improvements to the committee system along lines that have already been agreed by the parliamentarians will not produce a quantum leap in their effective contribution to democratic government. However, before proceeding to the details it is necessary first to introduce the question of yardsticks for assessing performance.
The Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees
It is widely recognised that Parliaments or assemblies can serve the interests of good government and democracy in a number of ways other than as law-making bodies, and the same point is true of committees. Some possible functions range from putting information in the public domain and holding government to account, to contributing to policy formation and taking government closer to the people. 
Committee on Government Assurances
The Committee on Government Assurances is mandated to scrutinise all assurances, promises and undertakings made by cabinet ministers and deputy ministers on the floor of the house, usually at question time or during the budget presentation, with the objective of ensuring that they are implemented. The committee quizzes the ministries concerning action taken and seeks clarification of issues not adequately dealt with in the Action-Taken reports that the government is obliged to make and which it is the responsibility of the Vice-President to present to the House. Once the committee takes the view that the government has satisfactorily discharged its obligation the committee announces closure of the issue (departments can appeal against non-closure but the committee can resolve to keep the assurance open). 
Committee on Delegated Legislation
The Committee on Delegated Legislation scrutinises whether the powers to make orders, rules, sub-rules and by-laws delegated by Parliament are being properly exercised. The instruments must be in accordance with the constitution or with statute law, and must not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or cause rights and liberties to be at the whim of administrative decisions. They must be concerned only with administrative details and not amount to substantive legislation. The committee, whose members usually include at least one MP with professional legal qualifications, meets around eight times a year. 
Departmentally-oriented Committees
In 1999 the seven departmentally-oriented 'watchdog' or investigatory committees were replaced by 11 new committees with the objective that for the first time all ministries and departments would be included in the arrangements for regular scrutiny and without overlap of The membership of the committees is usually eight, appointed on an annual basis (usually at least half are re-appointed from the previous year) and in theory with regard to party and gender balance, although the dominance of the National Assembly by men from the ruling party is a major constraint. The committees elect their own chair, drawn from the previous year's members and in some cases from outside the ruling party. Although the 1999 reforms are still very recent, and operational difficulties in the initial stages of implementation are only to be expected, it is still possible to make some assessment of the new committees' performance, against the background of their predecessors. But some important aspects of the reform agenda have not yet been implemented, such as allowing press attendance at meetings.
One suggestion is that there is a concern that journalists could easily misrepresent the discussions, in advance of a final report being agreed. xviii A realistic assessment is that the government is suspicious of the independent press, which it regards as partisan and unfairly critical of the government. It is wary of committee investigations being reported in the media before there is an opportunity to suppress the findings by persuading the House to agree that a report should not be adopted. The executive also resists the idea of taking the committee stage of legislation in the departmental committees and away from the floor of the House. It prefers the existing practice whereby the assembly is given very little notice of forthcoming legislative initiatives, where debate can be controlled by containing it within the formal rules of the House, and where the construction of a tight timetable may permit only minimal opportunity for detailed external scrutiny and public discussion.
That said, in respect of their oversight responsibilities all 11 committees have met on a regular basis -up to 16 times a year in some cases -and taken evidence from Permanent Secretaries (only rarely Ministers) from a range of departments and other public sector bodies and outside organisations. They have produced at minimum annual reports for 1999 and 2000, some of them long and very weighty. The reports have included consideration of Action-Taken reports by the government (which can occupy as much as a quarter of a committee's report before it gets round to 'topical issues'). There is a pattern to the principal findings of the committees, summarised under four main points below. They tell us a good deal about how the government actually functions; but space constraints allow only a few illustrations to be cited.
First, the committees reveal evidence of policy shortcomings -not so much policies that are not working successfully, as gaps where there is a policy vacuum, policy confusion and absence of clarity. For instance the government has 'not had a coherent policy framework on transport for a long time'. xix But although the committee that reported this observation administered a clear rebuke, the attempts to assign responsibility for policy delays are generally quite problematic, and this frustrates the need for answerability. The departmental submissions tend to put the onus on the cabinet, whereas the Action-Taken Reports assign the blame to the departments. Third there are claims that some weakness of policy implementation owe to failure by the government to adequately consult with stakeholders. The transport minister's (Nkandu Luo) decision that all minibuses be painted blue (the MMD party colour, incidentally) may look trivial, but as the communications committee (2000) observed, the decision and the short time allowed to comply with it caused much resentment. More serious is the government's failure to consult organised labour over the privatisation of ZCCM; it was always likely that many workers would become unemployed as a consequence of sale agreements, even where retrenchment was not a condition demanded by prospective purchasers. In fact organised labour argued in its evidence to the economic affairs committee that the government has no labour policy. Similarly other committees have indicted the government for failing to consider development issues on a longer-term basis and in a more consultative mode than just the annual budget preparations, which exhibit a hand-to-mouth approach to policy-making.
Fourth there is much evidence of inertia, non-implementation and failure to take action to implement decisions. This criticism applies especially to promises made in Action-Taken In sum the committees have exposed many causes for concern about the conduct of government. A plausible response might be 'well, they would do, wouldn't they?' Their mandate to carry out scrutiny and oversight contains a bias towards the negative -something that is likely to be accentuated further in the representation of their findings by political scientists, who are trained to be critical. However, it would be difficult to argue that the reports are unreasonable in any sense. And it is unusual for reports to be deemed so flawed or inaccurate by the government that it urges the House to send them back to the committee.
Moreover the reports are not so unbalanced as to be completely devoid of examples of commendation for the government, including for actions taken in response to committee recommendations. But the positive findings are far outweighed by the negative.
Ad Hoc Select Committees
The constitution and subsidiary legislation require that certain presidential appointments must be ratified by Parliament, and for this reason select committees of Parliament -usually ten members -are appointed from time to time to scrutinise nominations and make recommendations to the House. xxv The process should ensure that the correct procedures have been followed and that nominees have the necessary qualifications and experience, all of which should protect the manner of appointment from improper political interference.
In some cases, notwithstanding the fact that they are made by the President the appointments relate to institutions to check executive power and help prevent abuse of that The fact that the committee reports have only very infrequently objected to a nomination or, even more rarely signalled rejection (in July 1992 a nomination to the ZPA Board was rejected) does not necessarily mean they are no more than a 'rubber stamp'. The same raw data could instead be evidence that the executive, wary of being tripped up by the committee, has usually exercised its powers of nomination and appointment with due care. But some of the appointments have incurred political comment in the House, such as over a nomination to the Human Rights Commission in 1998. An objection grounded on the nominee's former role in government was countered by a speaker for the government who claimed the appointment would add a 'moderating factor' to a commission that had already exceeded its powers (the Commission was alleged to have briefed the media about its early findings of rights abuses, before first informing government). xxvi There was also a difference of opinion over the suitability of Justice Bwalya's appointment as chair of the Electoral Commission, given that he was a card-carrying member of the MMD. At least one member of the committee wanted to oppose the nomination; some opposition politicians took (and still take) the view that the Commission should comprise representatives of all main parties, if it is to acquire a reputation for impartiality. Evidence from a committee report is not often referred to in debates or question time on occasions other than when the report is first presented and formally considered for adoption.
In fact participation overall in the assembly is very uneven: attendance is sometimes poor and the records show that in any one sitting up to 30 MMD back-benchers will make no verbal intervention of any description. The public has virtually no access to the committee reports. MPs are not given extra copies they can distribute. And as the Committee on Education, Science and Technology has made clear, the complete absence of public funding of research at the universities or any other institute means there is very little research activity apart from what foreign donors take an interest in and choose to finance. Often they employ their own researchers, and typically they get to keep the results. Thus the committee's view is that the country 'did not know itself well enough because data was not readily available'. The accumulation of committee reports will in time offer a fascinating primary source. But the chances that it will fuel policy-relevant analyses by third parties and feed into official deliberations in that way, are not promising: the government is 'at the periphery of research activities' and looks set to remain there.
xli
Policies and policy agendas
Although MMD ministers often complain that opposition MPs should not just denigrate their policies but propose constructive alternatives, like governments the world over they are shy of admitting that any of their policy initiatives are borrowed from their critics. Even in Britain it is said that the observable effect of select committees on policy making is at best 'indirect and marginal, contextual rather than substantive'. xlii Zambia's parliamentary committees have focused more on the details of policy and especially implementation than undertake a responsibility for overall policy advice. Even so they have sought to place issues on or higher up the policy agenda, by drawing attention to existing weaknesses and shortcomings. While the concerns may have been in circulation already, they were given extra prominence and so stood more chance of catching the government's attention. An example is the dawning realisation that post-privatisation monitoring of agreements with foreign investors is essential to ensure that at least some of the profits made in Zambia are reinvested in the country. This 
Holding government to account
The question of how government responds to the committees' both when they are issuing demands for information and when advancing recommendations is critical to the objective of accountability. In Britain it has been said that the taking of evidence can be valuable in its own right as a means of holding ministers and others to account. xliv It is not essential to produce a really damning report by a committee in order to show that it made its mark. Neither should the effectiveness of a committee be inferred from the degree of hostility shown towards its findings, any more than it can be equated to the number of its recommendations the government accepts. That said, the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour can be singled out for discomfiting government over its allegations concerning the privatisation of ZCCM core and non-core assets. In December 1999, following a lively debate during which no less than five ministers and deputies felt obliged to defend the government, the Vice-President advised the House that it would be difficult to produce a meaningful Action- Taken In some cases the primary reason lies with external constraints that are beyond the government's control, such as unpredictable behaviour by the donors. And perhaps it is unreasonable to speculate whether ministers and officials will from now on attach more weight to the possibility of being 'exposed' in a committee report, in consequence of the 1999 reforms exerting a lagged effect. But the evidence from the 1990s as a whole is not encouraging. The conclusion is inescapable that reports and Action-Taken responses provide a formal procedure of answerability but without enforceability, the last being necessary to establish an effective instrument of accountability. Indeed, one suspicion is that the committees' work is viewed inside the government almost as an end in itself, as tangible evidence of democracy, or something that reduces the need for government to adjust its own behaviour. This is an unhappy conclusion, although arguably less dismal than where just the opportunity to hold debates in the House is argued to be proof of democratic accountability and is used as a ploy to suffocate potentially superior mechanisms of scrutiny, such as specialised 'watchdog'
committees. xlviii But in the circumstances the oversight committees look more like a token display than a serious contribution to democratic governance.
Parliament and the people
Access to MPs in the House by members of the electorate is 'extremely difficult', according to representatives of the independent news media declined to give evidence to the information and broadcasting committee (early evidence of lack of confidence in the value of the proceedings), although the committee still went on to make 27 recommendations aimed at strengthening autonomous media. The government's suspicion of the press and prominent NGOs whose agendas it finds too challenging creates a negative climate. It has inhibited MMD MPs from constructing potentially mutually beneficial relations with civic actors, and serves to limit the direct access those actors have to ministries and departments.
lii
Impact on MPs
What impact have the committees had on the parliamentarians themselves and on how they view their role in relation to the governing process? The practice of rotating the membership of committees has not helped MPs to develop individual expertise in specialised policy areas, which is one theoretical advantage. But the inter-party or cross-party nature of the committees'
work is more worthy of note, given the party-based system of political representation. We are unable to say how many divisive issues relating to policy have been deliberately avoided by committees so as to maintain internal harmony and avoid 'rocking the boat'. But a number of reports including some drafted under MMD chairs have been hard-hitting while showing no signs of serious rifts. It seems that committee work has encouraged at least some MPs to avoid the strict confines of party discipline and to value their role as members of the assembly sharing a common interest in pressing the executive to improve its performance. Also, MMD members of committees have joined in voicing their support in the House for their committees'
recommendations to strengthen institutions of governance like the Auditor General, judiciary and quasi-judicial bodies, that should perform as horizontal checks on the executive.
Recommendations that such institutions should be given greater powers, that they should report direct to the National Assembly and not to the President first, that they be allotted more resources and that control over funding should be transferred from the executive to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services to the scrutiny committee to note that financial constraints prevented him extending satellite-based radio and television coverage throughout the country. However the unfulfilled commitment was not a priority set by Parliament but a pledge made by the President! In general terms the committee that has behaved least like a fierce watchdog and has been least inclined to summon evidence from outside the public service, so denying everyone the benefit of independent advice, is the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. National security is one area where the executive can legitimately refuse to submit evidence. And the infrequency with which foreign affairs provide the subject matter of questions in Parliament suggests this area of policy is regarded as an executive, and specifically presidential, prerogative, rather than being the business of Parliament. However, although on paper the reform programme looks impressive there can be no guarantee that any of the recommended changes, not even more ample funding, will dramatically alter executive-legislative relations unless there are changes to the constitution and in the party system and political culture. As Weaver and Rockman have argued, there is no 'institutional fix' to policy problems; moreover the functioning of institutions is 'influenced by the historical and societal contexts in which they developed, evolved and have operated'. lx A well-established view of select committees is that not only will they reflect the weaknesses (as well as strengths) of Parliament more broadly but legislatures in turn tend to be influenced by the executive to which they spend most of their time responding. Thus, generally speaking the way that a committee functions cannot be understood in isolation from their wider institutional environment lxi -and that means not only formal organisational structures but also the informal practice of customs, conventions, norms and mores. The Zambian situation is illustrative. Five groups of points will be made.
First, at the heart of executive-legislative relations there is confusion over collective and individual responsibility that in practice allows both the cabinet and ministers individually to hide behind one another. This weakens answerability and takes away enforceability. The legislature has few effective sanctions against a minister's failure to produce a satisfactory response to committee recommendations. The powers to refuse to pass a bill (or threaten to do so) and to reject a department's budget after the annual debate on the Estimates are not vacuous but they are inflexible and inappropriate. Indeed it is precisely the issue of inadequate sanctions that caused much heated argument over the proposed reforms to the committee structure when they were first put to a special meeting of the assembly on 4
December 1999. That particular meeting had to be abandoned as a result. lxviii In part also, and rather more special to Zambia (though widespread in Africa) is the neo-patrimonial and clientelistic basis of political relationships that is ingrained within both the political and the administrative spheres. It undercuts attempts to make sound policy performance and competent governance for the betterment of the whole society the determining yardsticks for assessing governmental performance and rewarding success/penalising failure. As the recent campaign for a presidential 'third term' demonstrates, money has the power to buy political support, particularly when it is in short supply, even though the objective is not always attained. The widely shared perception that Parliament is just a 'rubber stamp' is another historical fact that continues to militate against the chances of it being taken more seriously. When it undermines efforts to make a sustained attempt at reform, a sense of impotence will beget impotence.
Fourth, high levels of public apathy and low levels of political participation, which show up in weak figures for voter registration and electoral turnouts, are a pronounced feature of the political culture among the general populace lxix Of course once again we should beware of simplistic judgments. The limitations of the Electoral Commission have contributed to the ineffectiveness of voter registration drives, and the responsibility for this lies with the government's refusal to provide adequate resources. In addition there must be doubts about the electoral process, not so much because of ballot-rigging but because the pre-poll circumstances prevent a level playing field. For instance the police force has been thoroughly politicised. The police proscribe political meetings and demonstrations where they claim they could not guarantee public safety, but do so in a highly partisan fashion. They have consistently disallowed events planned by parties and NGOs opposing the government, and given a virtual carte blanche to the MMD, even where it has not observed the proper procedures, and they have turned a blind eye to violence by MMD supporters. All these factors can only serve to blunt the effectiveness even of a moderately strong opposition party in its endeavours to make government accountable. And against such a background arguments about the potentially negative electoral consequences of ignoring the recommendations of parliamentary committees or of being compelled by Parliament to replace ministers will not cause the government much anxiety or compel it to reform its behaviour. Here, the development of a more secure and vibrant private media -radio and television as well as press -would offer a positive force for change especially by giving more sustained publicity to committee findings and providing independent commentary and analysis. That said, the widespread poverty and weak economic conditions will continue to pose major barriers not just to the flourishing of independent media but a highly participatory form of politics, for some considerable time to come.
Finally, the committee reports create an indelible impression that within the public service the substitution of professional norms and an ethos of personal responsibility for inertia and indiscipline are essential but unlikely to be achieved without a reworking of the incentive structures. 467 and 463. 'In any given setting, it is hard to prove that proposed reforms would improve governmental effectiveness because claims must be either counterfactual or
